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1. Characteristics of Local Entrepreneurs in Khorat 
      The characteristics of local entrepreneurs in Khorat can besummarized by 
the following points. These are drawn from field research that I conducted in Thet 
saban Muang Nakhon Ratchasima (from February 1991 to February 1992). Part of 
my research consisted of interviewing the most influential entrepreneurs (46 
individuals) in Khorat. The details of this study are contained in Chapter 3, Ueda 
1995-
1-1. Dominance of Chinese Descendants 
      Nearly 90 percent of business leaders in, Khorat are Chinese immigrants 
and their descendants. Teochiu Chinese command an overwhelming majority 
among the Chinese speech groups, as is the case in the whole country. However, 
their consciousness of being Chinese is decreasing as Thailand-born Chinese 
descendants become more and more dominant.
1-2. Small-Scale Businesses Run by Family 
      Most of the businesses managed by local businessmen are small-scale. 
According to a company directory which lists the largest 1,111 companies in 
Thailand, only two companies which were managed by local entrepreneurs in 
Khorat were ranked among the top 1,111 companies in terms of sales, profits, and
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assets in 1988. One of these two was a factory which produces automobile parts, 
and the other was a distributor of petroleum products. 
      Small-scale family business has traditionally characterized Chinese 
business practices elsewhere in Asia. In the early stages of settlement, newly 
arrived Chinese had no choice but to start a small business which involved the 
whole family. This preference for family businesses can also be explained by the 
fact that family members can be trusted because "kinship relations are the 
irreducible jural and moral relations" [Landa 1981: 3581. Chinese tend to retain 
this preference for family involvement in their businesses even after their 
businesses grow.
1-3. Weakness in Manufacturing and Preference for Commerce and Service, 
Few Exportable Manufactured Products 
      Decision-making is highly centralized in family businesses. Therefore, 
generally speaking, Chinese business people prefer sectors where decision-making 
is easily centralized, such as real estate and retailing. Almost all my interviewees 
in Khorat are involved in, or have experiences in shopkeeping more or less. 
      In Khorat, only a very small number of local entrepreneurs are engaged in 
high-valued manufacturing products which are exportable. This weakness in 
manufacturing can be attributed not only to a lack of technology, but also to the 
Chinese preference for family businesses. This is because highly-centralized 
management is at a disadvantage in operating manufacturing which needs 
sophisticated technology and complicated management. 
      Chinese entrepreneurs can overcome technological problems through joint 
ventures with foreign companies. This is the way which most of the Sino-Thai 
business groups have taken in launching into the manufacturing sector. However, 
in Khorat, there were exceptionally few entrepreneurs who sought technical 
cooperation from foreign enterprises.
1-4. The Importance of Creditworthiness in the Local Business World 
     Local entrepreneurs in Khorat place great importance on creditworthiness
- 124 -
in doing business. This means that they conduct business transactions relying on 
mutual trust. This mutual trust is established through personal and 
particularistic exchange-relations in the local community. Chinese associations 
based on dialect, birth place, and surname were once a means through which 
Chinese businessmen showed to what extent they have established credibility, and 
through which they acquire information about their potential trading partners at a 
low, or virtually zero, cost. 
    In an environment where the legal system is not well developed, entrepreneurs 
have to cope with the problem of contract uncertainty by arranging non-legal 
institutions which constrain traders from breaking their contracts. Personalized 
exchange relationships based on mutual trust among the members of Chinese 
associations was such a device which in the past substituted for contract law and 
increased the efficiency of economic activities. 
      However, nowadays, contrary to local Chinese associations, which are 
becoming less significant in business circles, trade societies and nationwide 
organizations, such as the Chamber of Commerce, are becoming more important and 
have begun to fulfill the role of screening members. 
      In general, as the legal framework is developed, personal exchange 
networks are gradually replaced by contract enforcement based on law. However, 
in a provincial city like Khorat dense person-to-person informal relationships still 
function as an important means of constraining breach of contract, compared with 
Bangkok, where impersonal exchange relations through market mechanisms are 
dominant. This point will be discussed again in Section 3.
1-5. A Remote Relationship with Foreign Capital 
      As mentioned in 3), a remote relationship with foreign countries prevents 
local entrepreneurs in Khorat from seeking technical cooperation with foreign 
companies, and from launching into new manufacturing sectors. 
     Khorat enjoyed almost no foreign investment until about 1990, when foreign 
companies began to operate in the Suranaree Industrial Zone, a privately-operated 
industrial zone. After that, the inflow of foreign capital, mainly from Japan and
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Taiwan, seemed to become a steady stream in this city. However, direct foreign 
investment established few, if any, close links with local industries. Local 
entrepreneurs in Khorat provided export-oriented foreign investors with scarcely 
any of the materials, parts, or machines necessary for production. 
      In Cambodia and Laos, where Teochiu Chinese are dominant among 
Chinese and Chinese descendants, Thailand is one of the largest foreign investors 
(perhaps due to connections among Teochiu Chinese). However, I found only one 
local entrepreneur in Khorat who has a definite plan to invest overseas, although 
some did express an interest in investing in Indochina in the future. 
1-6. Entrepreneurs Seeking Political Patronage from Bangkok 
      In Khorat, the movement of local entrepreneurs in seeking political 
patronage from Bangkok takes several forms, besides direct financial support for 
politicians. 
      First, influential politicians who have held high-ranking posts in the 
Cabinet participate in large business projects in Khorat. Ex-prime minister 
Chatichai Choonhavan is involved in the establishment of a private industrial zone, 
and Suwat Liptapallop, a member of parliament, belonging to the Chart Pattana 
Party at present, is one of the largest shareholders in a luxury hotel in Khorat. 
      Secondly, several outstanding local entrepreneurs formed a political body in 
order to support candidates for seats on municipal council (so. tho.) and provincial 
council (so. co.) The striking feature in their cases is that they have not run in local 
elections in person, but instead have had their children stand as candidates. Their 
political body was so successful in local elections as to exert a great influence on 
local politics in Khorat. These influential businessmen regarded, to some extent, 
local politics as an initial step toward the political world in Bangkok: that is, 
candidateship in general election. 
      The tendency for wealthy provincial entrepreneurs to launch into local 
politics has become pronounced after the period from 1973 to 1976, when Thailand 
saw the development of electoral politics. Electoral politics demands large outlays 
from candidates for election campaigns in order to win votes. This is one of the
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reasons why well-to-do businessmen began to move into politics from this time. In 
Khorat, it was from the 1980s that local businessmen began to launch into local 
politics and grew to be an overwhelming power. 
      Thailand has a highly-centralized system of provincial administration. 
Today's system of provincial administration is based on Thesaphiban system, which 
was established in 1894 by Prince Damrong Rajanubhab, and the characteristics of 
the centralized administrative system have changed little since then. Important 
decision- and policy-making are mostly carried out in Bangkok by central 
government agencies. 
      Because of this centralization of political power in Bangkok, Bangkok-based 
entrepreneurs were able to enjoy advantages over provincial entrepreneurs in 
seeking political patronage for several decades. This ability was strengthened with 
the process of centralization during the period from 1958 to 1973, when Thailand 
was governed by a military-dominated authoritarian government. The most 
explicit example was found in the intimate relationship between the army and 
commercial banks. During this period, almost all Sino-Thai banks offered posts on 
their board of directors to influential military officials. These military officials 
received rewards, for instance, in the form of allowances for attending meetings, 
bonuses, and dividends. It is plausible to argue that, in exchange for these rewards, 
commercial banks received protection from competition, such as restraints in new 
entry. After the Cabinet passed a resolution in 1955 calling for restrictions on the 
approval of new banks, the establishment of only two banks, the Thai Military Bank 
(1957) and the Asia Trust Bank (1965) were allowed throughout his period. 
     After 1973, when Thailand saw the development of electoral politics, 
provincial wealthy businessmen were able to seek political connections through 
launching into politics.
1-7. Discontinuity of Chinese: the Special Circumstances to Khorat 
      During the Second World War, those who did not possess Thai nationality 
were forced to leave Amphoe Muang Nakhon Ratchasima because an army base was 
located there. According to an old Chinese businessman in Khorat, all Chinese
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who were not naturalized Thai disappeared from Khorat as a result of this 
prohibited-areas policy, and only a few of them returned after the war. He stated 
that a great number of Chinese had to leave and that they dispersed all over the co 
untry. 
      This policy imposed hardships on Chinese business activities in Khorat. 
Chinese aliens were forced to suspend their economic activities and were deprived of 
what they accumulated through their businesses. Since only a few of these 
Chinese people returned to Khorat after the war, it follows that the continuity of 
Chinese society in Khorat was largely disrupted. My research shows that many of 
the economic leaders of Khorat were not born locally. 
      The economy of Khorat, like that of other provincial economies, made 
progress through the frequent migration of talented Chinese individuals from 
Bangkok and other regions. My research in Ratchaburi Province in 1989 [±ffl 
1990] found that the local textile industry had its origin in small-scale 
manufacturing that was started by Hakkas who had moved from Bangkok by the 
second half of the 1930s. Today, some of these textile companies, though very small 
in number, have developed an exporting industry. These Hakka Chinese gained 
experience and know-how by working in Chinese-run textile factories in Bangkok. 
This suggests that manufacturing in local provinces was established by Chinese 
who had initially gained technical know-how in Bangkok and then become widely 
dispersed over the country several decades before 1960, when the Thai government 
introduced an industrialization policy. 
      However, the eviction of Chinese nationals brought the Ithorat economy to a 
standstill for several years in the 1940s. Furthermore, this eviction would have 
had a hampering effect on any budding manufacturing sector, if indeed the 
formation of a local manufacturing sector, such as the textile industry, was 
underway. The lack of locally-developed manufacturing in Khorat might be 
attributed to this discontinuity of the Chinese. 
      Although my viewpoint aboutlocal entrepreneurs is based on my research 
in Thetsaban Muang Nakhon Ratchasima, I believe that the situation of other 
provinces is more or less similar to that of Khorat. Furthermore, local
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entrepreneurs in Khorat share many characteristics in common, to some extent, 
with those that have been observed in overseas Chinese in other Asian countries 
(particularly points 2, 3, 4 and 6).
2. The Establishment of a Bangkok-Concentrated Economy: 
  The Contribution of Local Entrepreneurs to Economic 
  Growth in Thailand 
2-1. Factors Creating a Bangkok-Concentrated Economy in Thailand 
2-1-1. Geographical Conditions 
      Bangkok has increasingly become the important economic center of 
Thailand since Thailand entered the world economy in 1855. This is because the 
Thai economy has basically grown through expanding exports of primary products 
such as rice since that time, and because the port of Bangkok has been the pre-
eminent international port in Thailand (which can largely be attributed to the 
geographical nature of Bangkok). 
      Bangkok (Bangkok-Thonburi), which is located near the mouth of the 
Chaophraya River, became the capital of the kingdom in 1767. The good port 
location may well have appealed to the political authorities in deciding the site of 
the capital. The port of Bangkok became increasingly significant when rice exports 
expanded sharply after the Bowring Treaty of 1855. The importance of Bangkok 
has not decreased since that time. 
      Geographical conditions strongly influenced economic development in 
Thailand. "Thailand is a rather isolated country which opens only towards the sea" 
[Donner 1978:4]. Thailand is divided from Burma and Cambodia by distinct 
mountain chains, and from Laos by the huge Mekong River. These form natural 
boundaries which make surface transport difficult. In contrast o these land routes, 
the broad opening to the sea, that is, the coasts and ports of Thailand, permit easier 
access. In terms of the effect on the Thai economy as a whole, the Bangkok-
Chaophraya River has been the trunk line of transportation in Thailand. The 
favorable location for a port on the Chaophraya River, which was the best access
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point to Thailand from the sea, enabled Bangkok to develop into the dominant port. 
      Geographical conditions are the comparative advantage which makes 
Bangkok a transport node in Thailand. All transportation networks have been 
constructed with Bangkok at the hub and extending from Bangkok in many 
directions throughout the country. Accumulative investment in transportation 
facilities and networks can be seen as being a continuously influential comparative 
advantage for Bangkok, enabling her to attract people and economic activities. 
      As urban economics explains the rational for the existence of cities, Bangkok 
arose because "people have found it advantageous to carry on various activities in a 
spatially concentrated fashion" [Mills and Hamilton 1994: 7]. In other words, 
because scale economies enable people to generate higher returns on investment in 
urban areas than in rural areas, the Bangkok-concentrated economic structure has 
been formed. 
      Until comparatively recently, when congestion began to impose increasingly 
higher costs on entrepreneurs in managing businesses in Bangkok, Bangkok-based 
entrepreneurs and foreign investors had few incentives to locate (or move) their 
businesses in (or to) the provinces. The government's recent policies to promote 
investments in the outer provinces can be seen as an attempt to cut production costs 
in these provinces and to stimulate investment there. Before such policies were 
enacted, the provinces attracted "only those sectors with scale economies that were 
exhausted by the demands of small populations" [Mills and Hamilton 1994: 15], 
such as small-scale retail trading. If successful entrepreneurs in the provinces 
desire to expand their businesses, they have in the past moved to Bangkok, which 
can support large-scale industries whose scale economies are exhausted only by the 
demands of a larger population. Their decision to move to Bangkok can be 
explained by the cost advantages such as economies of scale and the reduction of 
transport costs which Bangkok offers them. 
      Provinces can contain some large-scale industries, from a viewpoint of 
production costs. Transport cost-oriented industries, such as sugar factories and 
tapioca processing industries, are induced to locate at or near an input source 
because an input is costly to transport. The reason why Khorat has a successful
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businessman in tapioca processing can be explained by the fact Nakhon Ratchasima 
Province is one of Thailand's cassava-producing centers.
2-1-2. The Concentration of Political Power in Bangkok 
      Access to political power was far easier for Bangkok-based entrepreneurs 
than for provincial ones because, in Thailand, political power has traditionally been 
concentrated in Bangkok as mentioned in 6 of Section 1. Particularly during the 
period from 1958 to 1973, the concentration of political power was enhanced. This 
left little room for provincial entrepreneurs to have their business interests reflected 
in the national budget and policy-making, until at least the political climate became 
open in 1973, and provincial businessmen began to launch into politics. 
      The concentration of political power in Bangkok has also been a great 
disadvantage to provincial entrepreneurs vis-a-vis their Bangkok-based 
counterparts. Provincial businessmen have had difficulties in seeking the political 
patronage which might be useful for their business success. Especially during the 
pre-1973 period, some Bangkok-based entrepreneurs acquired large returns 
through close relationships with politically-influential figures, which functioned as 
a springboard in expanding their businesses. Typical examples of this were found 
in the commercial banking sector. (See 1-6.)
2-2. The Contribution of Local Entrepreneurs to Economic Growth in Thailand 
      The growth of the manufacturing sector and the export of manufactured 
products are seen as the most significant factors in the process of economic 
development in Thailand. Based on the results of my research in Khorat, economic 
backwardness in provincial economies in Thailand can be best summarized in the 
following three points; small-scale business, weak manufacturing, and few 
exportable manufactured products. These points suggest that the contribution of 
provincial entrepreneurs to the economic development of Thailand as a whole have 
not yet been great. 
   The contribution of Nakhon Ratchasima Province to the Thai economy can be 
examined by reference to national income statistics. According to Table 1, Nakhon
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Ratchasima Province held a stable proportion of 4.1 or 4.2 percent of the kingdom's 
population throughout the 1975-1990 period. On the other hand, its share of the 
GDP decreased: from 2.4 percent in 1975 to 2.2 percent in 1980, and to 1.8 percent in 
1990. The reverse phenomenon, that is, an increase in the GDP and population 
ratio, happened in Bangkok and her vicinity (five neighboring provinces). The 
increase in the share of the GDP by Bangkok and vicinity from 1975 was 
particularly marked, while the GDP and population growth in Bangkok Metropolis 
was sluggish.
Table 1. The Share in GDP, Population, and per capita GDP: Nakhon 
       Ratchasima Province, the Northeast, Bangkok Metropolis, and 
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Source: Ueda [1995: Table 3] 
Note: GDP at current market prices. 
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      During this period, economic activities in Bangkok began to move to 
suburban areas, and new investments poured not into Bangkok but also into her 
neighboring provinces. This tendency seemed to strengthen when Thailand 
experienced two-digit economic growth during the period from 1988 to 1990. In 
1990, Bangkok and the five neighboring provinces, with 16 percent of the Thai 
population, produced more than half of the GDP. 
      Judging from this data, with the growth of economy, economic activity in 
Thailand still continues to be concentrated in Bangkok and, particularly now, her 
neighboring provinces, what is called ` the Greater Bangkok Economic Zone.' Once 
established, it may be thought that it would be difficult to change the Bangkok-
concentrated economic structure. This is because accumulated wealth increasingly 
adds to the comparative advantage of Bangkok, which enables Bangkok to increase 
its wealth furthermore. It is fair to say that economic growth in Thailand has 
proceeded so far, taking the form of spatial expansion of `the Greater Bangkok 
Economic Zone.' 
      Nowadays, the Thai economy shows signs of decentralization because of the 
prohibitive costs faced by entrepreneurs in carrying out business activities in 
Bangkok, and because the costs of managing businesses in the provinces have 
been cut through government policies to promote investments in the outer 
provinces. 
      However, the economic growth of Bangkok, not that of the provincial 
economies, has given rise to this decentralization. The driving force which has 
increased investment in the provinces mainly exists in Bangkok capital and foreign 
capital. Economic decentralization in Thailand should be regarded as part of the 
expansion of the Bangkok economy, not as a sign of remarkable development in the 
provincial economies. The contribution of provincial entrepreneurs to the economic 
development of Thailand has been limited so far.
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3. The Niche of Local Entrepreneurs: Competition and 
  Symbiosis with Bangkok-Based Entrepreneurs 
      It is difficult to imagine that the Bangkok-centered economic structure is in 
grave danger of collapse in the immediate future. However, it is also true that 
provincial entrepreneurs still enjoy an advantage over their counterparts in 
Bangkok. In order to make this point clear, I would like to divide the economic 
order into three institutions, that is, market, government, and community. 
       In the standard argument of economics, economic systemsare composed of 
two mechanisms: market and government. The market is the place where the 
optimal allocation of resources is achieved through free transactions among 
individuals who act solely in the pursuit of private gain. When the allocations 
attained through markets are not efficient, market failure occurs. This is often 
said to justify government intervention in the market, so that public goods can be 
provided by the government. 
      Althoughmany economists frequently make comparisons of the advantages 
of market mechanisms vis-a-vis the government, I would like to avoid discussing the 
government any further, and instead focus attention on a third institution, which 
plays an important role which neither market nor government can fulfill, and acts to 
support hem. This is ` community.' Community is a group which is constituted by 
a relatively small number of individuals who are connected by something common 
to all of them, such as kinship or place of origin. People who are living in a village 
constitute a village community, and Chinese associations form communities on the 
basis of birth place, ethnicity, or family name. These communities are 
characterized by intense person-to-person i formal networks among members. 
This is in contrast with market mechanisms where impersonal networks and ` arm's 
length' relationships are evident. 
      In the marketplace, price transmits the information ecessary for trading to 
each individual. On the other hand, in communities, membership can send signals 
regarding trustworthiness to other members. In communities, "if v1Tv2 (read: vl 
trust v2 ), and v2Tv3, then v1Tv3" [Landa 1981: 360]. This personal network of
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community enables members to acquire information about the trustworthiness of 
other members who may be potential trading partners at a very low cost. 
Community membership economizes transactions costs, which is defined as the 
additional costs of doing business such as the cost of collecting information and 
decision-making costs. 
      The reduction of transactions costs is a crucial problem for entrepreneurs 
in today's economy, where transactions costs absorb a substantial proportion of 
national product where entrepreneurs are forced to incur heavy transactions costs, 
business efficiency is spoiled. Provincial entrepreneurs have an advantage over 
their Bangkok-based counterparts, in that it is possible for them to reduce 
information costs through personal relations within their communities. 
      It may be difficult for Bangkok-based entrepreneursto enjoy this advantage 
through informal networks because Bangkok contains too large a population to be 
governed by the rules of community, that is, relationships based on mutual trust. 
Market mechanisms are the dominant force in the Bangkok economy. 
      Local entrepreneurs can be competitive with Bangkok-based ones to the 
extent that they manage to best exploit the advantages of the community. Unlike 
entrepreneurs in Bangkok, who operate solely in the impersonal and anonymous 
`extended order' of the market
, provincial entrepreneurs enjoy access to an order 
that is based on close and personal relationships within local business circles, and 
the credibility which is established through these close relationships. 
      This advantage is of course greater than in somesectors of the economy than 
in others, and therefore local entrepreneurs will be successful to the extent that they 
concentrate on areas where this advantage is greatest. 
      One area where the community enjoys an advantage over the market is 
where the costs of drawing up contracts, that is transaction costs (or information 
costs), are very large. One typical case in point is the financial sector. Credibility 
and trustworthiness among businessmen can compensate for imperfect information 
in the market, and increase business efficiency through the reduction of transaction 
costs. 
     In August 1996, the cabinet accepted the Finance Ministry's proposal to
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grant new banking licenses to three consortia. One of the winning bidders is a 
consortium which is headed by MBK Property Development PCL, and plans to 
establish the Ratchasima Bank PCL, with headquarters in Nakhon Ratchasima. It 
may be difficult to challenge the established branch networks of Bangkok-based 
banks. However, if this new bank can make full use of personal networks in the 
business community of Khorat, the potential of this bank will be great.
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